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CASE NOTES
Patent Law—Previously Paid Royalties—No Recovery by Licensee
upon judgment of Invalidity—Troxel Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co.'—Following notice from Schwinn that Troxel Manufactur-
ing Company was infringing a design patent held by Schwinn,2 the two
companies entered into a licensing agreement.' The agreement, which
released Troxel from liability for the alleged infringement, conferred
upon Troxel the non-exclusive right to manufacture bicycle seats cov-
ered by the Schwinn patent.' In return, Troxel agreed to pay a royalty
on each seat sold,' and Schwinn agreed to take action against alleged
infringers.'
As the result of one such action for infringement, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California entered
judgment against Schwinn on January 8, 1969, declaring the patent
Troxel thereupon notified Schwinn of its intent to escrow
1 — F.2d —, 175 U.S.P.Q. 65, Nos. 72-1106-07 (6th Cir., Aug. 11, 1972).
2 Schwinn was the assignee of design patent D-204,121 issued to Frank Brilando on
March 15, 1966. Schwinn, over a four-year period, marketed 1,295,630 bicycle seats em-
bodying the design of this patent. Brief for Appellee at 3, Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co., 175 U.S.P.Q. 65, Nos. 72-1106-07 (6th Cir., Aug. 11, 1972) thereinafter
Brief for Appellee].
8 On June 1, 1967. Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 4.
4 Brief for Appellant at 3, Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 175 U.S.P.Q.
65, Nos. 72-1106-07 (6th Cir., Aug. 11, 1972) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. Licenses
may be exclusive or non-exclusive. A non-exclusive license merely nullifies the licensor's
right to bring suit against the licensee for infringement of the patent. In contrast, an
exclusive license, besides serving as an agreement not to sue for infringement, may also
prohibit further licensing and use of the invention by the licensor. R. Ellis, Patent Licenses
§ 211, at 238 (3d ed. A. Defier 1958) [hereinafter cited as Ellis]. Further, a non-exclusive
Licensee may not be a proper party to an infringement suit. Id., § 387, at 425. On the
other hand, the exclusive licensee holds fuller rights in the patent, and he may be entitled
to be a party in a suit for infringement. Id., §§ 381, 386 at 425.
6 The particular arrangement between Troxel and Schwinn was for a per-unit
royalty, payable quarterly. Appendix to Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 21-22. For
examples of other royalty agreements see Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., .339 U.S. 827, 830 (1950) (royalties calculated on basis of sales); Kraus v.
General Motors Corp., 120 F.2d 109, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1941) (fixed royalty per unit
manufacture with guaranteed daily production minimum); Tema Co. v. Holland
Furnace Co., 73 F.2d 553, 554 (6th Cir. 1934) (royalty payment per unit manufacture
until royalty maximum has been reached; Bird's-Eye Veneer Co. v. Franck-Phillpson &
Co., 259 F. 266, 267 (6th Cir. 1918) (fixed monthly payment). See generally Ellis, supra
note 3, § 129, at 148.
o Appendix to Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 22. By agreement, either party
to a license may bring suit against alleged infringers, either at the expense of the party
bringing suit or at the expense of both parties. Ellis, supra note 3, § 193, at 221. However,
any action required to be taken must be reasonable in light of the licensee's interests.
Id., § 195. The relationship between the expense involved in bringing the suit and the
benefits to be received therefrom Is relevant to a determination of the adequacy of the
steps actually taken to protect the patent. Id. at 223.
7 Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 U.S.P.Q. 587 (N.D.
Cal., Jan. 8, 1969).
501
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
further royalty payments pending outcome of the appeal of the district
court decision to the Ninth Circuit. Pending decision by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Schwinn brought suit against Troxel in the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in December 1969 to collect the escrowed
royalties.° The suit was settled when Troxel agreed to pay in full the
overdue royalties and to continue royalty payments .°
The decision of the California district court was affirmed on De-
ceMber 22, 1970." Following the affirmance, Troxel made no payments
to Schwinn for the last quarter of 1970.11 Thereafter, Schwinn acknowl-
edged that the patent was invalid as adjudged and that no further
royalties would be required for any seats sold after the date of the
affirmance. 12
Three months later, Troxel initiated an action in the District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee to recover all past royalty pay-
ments together with interest from the date of each payment or, alterna-
tively, those royalties paid after the California district court decision
together with interest from the date of each payment." Schwinn
counterclaimed for royalties which Troxel had failed to pay for seats
manufactured in the last quarter of 1970. 14 Troxel moved for summary
judgment."
The district court granted Troxel's motion and held that Schwinn
must return all royalty payments to Troxel, with interest accruing from
the date of entry of such judgment." The court reached this decision
by applying to the facts of the case—and, it will be submitted, by
unduly extending—the federal policy" encouraging early challenges
to the validity of a patent as pronounced by the Supreme Court in the
landmark decision Lear, Inc. v. Adleins.'s
8 Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 4.
9 Id.
10 Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 301 (9th Cir.
1970).
11 Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 5. Troxel paid royalties of $77,158.55 from
Jan. 8, 1969, the date of the California district court decision, up to the fourth quarter
of 1970. Id. at 4.
12 Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 4. Total royalties paid by Troxel to Schwinn
from the date of the licensing agreement up to the fourth quarter of 1970 amounted to
$125,915.25. Id.
13 Id. at 2. In addition, Troxel sought a declaration that it was not liable for
royalties due in the last quarter of 1970. Id.
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id.
18 Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 334 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (W.D. Tenn.
1971).
17 At this point it is appropriate to remind the reader that public policy "is a very
unruly horse, and when once you get astride it, you never know where it will carry you."
Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252 (1824). It is hoped that this note, in examining
the effect of recoupment on federal patent policy, will shed some light on an old saw.
18 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). Lear is the leading case delimiting this federal policy.
There the Supreme Court resolved a long-standing conflict between state contract law and
federal patent law. Lear held that federal patent law preempted application of the state
doctrine of licensee estoppel. For an exhaustive discussion of Lear and the issue of pre-
502
CASE NOTES
The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed and HELD: a licensee may
avoid royalty payments due after he has repudiated the license and the
patent has ultimately been adjudged invalid, but he may not recoup
royalty payments made prior to repudiation." The court concluded
that the federal policies which foster technological progress and the
free use of ideas belonging in the public domain are sufficiently served
by existing remedies, making unnecessary the additional remedy of
total recoupment of royalties. 2° Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that
the district court's stretching of Lear would in fact discourage a licensee
from bringing an early challenge to the validity of a patent."
This note will examine the arguments mustered by the court of
appeals in reaching its decision to refuse recoupment of past royalty
payments by a licensee following a judgment of invalidity. Discussion
will center initially upon the facts and holdings in the seminal Supreme
Court case of Lear, Inc, v. Adkins." The rationale propounded by the
Supreme Court in Lear will then be distinguished from that of the
district court in Troxel, and the propriety of the remedy fashioned by
the district court will be assessed in light of that distinction. An exam-
ination of the arguments espoused by the court of appeals will then
serve to elucidate the court of appeals' analysis of the effect of recoup-
ment on the patent system. Briefly, the circuit court warned that the
remedy of recoupment would discourage early challenge of a patent's
validity, inhibit the licensor's profitable use of the royalties, and impede
technological progress by compelling resort to trade secrets as the sole
means of exploiting an invention. In addition, the court considered the
possibility of recoupment in light of the eviction doctrine. The note will
conclude with a brief analysis—not undertaken by the circuit court—
of the viability of the recoupment remedy when tested by principles
of state contract and federal antitrust law.
The Sixth Circuit held that the decision of the district court was
grounded upon an unwarranted extension of Lear." Comparison of
the facts in Lear24 with those in Troxel reveals their dissimilarity and
exposes the weak fabric of the district court's opinion. Adkins, an
inventor, was employed by Lear to discover an economical gyroscope
which would meet the exacting standards of the aviation industry. The
employment agreement specified that any of Adkins' inventions relating
to gyroscopes would remain his personal property and that Lear would
emption, see, e.g., Arnold & Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 Texas L. Rev. 1235 (1970);
Comment, The "Decent Burial" of Patent Licensee Estoppel, 1970 Duke L.J. 375;
Comment, The "Decent Public Burial" of the Doctrine of Patent Licensee Estoppel, 11
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 517 (1970).
'° 175 U.S.P.Q. at 70.
2° Id.
21 Id. at 68.
22 395 U.S. 653 (1968).
28 175 U.S.P.Q. at 66.
24 The following recounting of the facts in Lear is taken from the opinion of the
majority in that case. 395 U.S. at 655-63.•
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be granted a license on a royalty basis to be determined. Subsequently,
Adkins developed a valuable gyroscope which Lear promptly incorpo-
rated into the manufacture of its aircraft, and Lear and Adkins under-
took to negotiate a licensing agreement while Adkins filed an applica-
tion for a patent. The agreement produced by that negotiation granted
Lear the right to terminate if the Patent Office refused to grant the
patent or if the patent, once granted, were later adjudicated invalid.
Pursuant to the agreement, Lear paid royalties to Adkins for the use of
the gyroscope pending decision by the Patent Office. However, after the
Patent Office had twice rejected Adkins' application, but while another
application was still pending, Lear repudiated the agreement by an-
nouncing that it had uncovered prior art which anticipated Adkins'
gyroscope, and that it would pay no further royalties. Three years later,
the Patent Office issued Adkins his patent and he immediately brought
suit in state court for the accrued royalties. Lear asserted the invalidity
of the patent as a defense,' but the California Supreme Court held
that the doctrine of licensee estoppel precluded its making such a chal-
lenge,' notwithstanding the considerable disrepute in which the doc-
trine was viewed.27 The Supreme Court reversed, abandoning the estop-
26 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970) provides in part that invalidity of a patent may be
pleaded as a defense to an infringement suit.
20 Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 891, 435 P.2d 321, 325-26, 64 Cal. Rptr.
545, 549-50 (1967).
27 The doctrine of licensee estoppel prevented a licensee from challenging the
validity of the patent upon suit by the licensor for royalties due under the license. It
rests on the assumption that a licensee derives a double benefit from the license. First,
he protects his own commercial operations from unlicensed competitors. Secondly, he
retains immunity from suit for patent infringement which otherwise may be brought by
the licensor. Thus, under the doctrine, a licensee has received what he had bargained for
and he cannot avoid payment by showing that the patent is, in fact, invalid. Ellis,
supra note 3, § 225, at 255.
Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216, 1217-18 (No. 17,647) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846), the
case which first spawned the doctrine, analogized the patent licensing agreement to a
lease of land. Under the latter agreement, a lessee could not challenge the lessor's right
to lease the property while the lessee continued on the land, enjoying the use thereof.
The Supreme Court approved the rule in Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289,
292-93 (1855), holding that a licensee can no more be allowed to deny the validity of
a patent while enjoying its use than an agent, who has collected a debt for his principal,
can insist on keeping the money, by alleging that the debt is not justly due.
Other courts described the doctrine similarly. For example, Marston v. Swett, 82
N.Y. 526, 533 (1880), held that a licensee got what he bargained for and could not
affirm and disaffirm a patent at the same time. However, the doctrine of licensee estoppel
waxed and waned until its final demise in Lear.
The courts were ingenious in avoiding the doctrine. In Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully,
144 U.S. 224, 235-38 (1892), the Court, on grounds of public policy, refused to grant an
injunction to enforce a clause within the licensing agreement in which the licensee bad
promised never to contest the validity of the patent. In Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.
v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1924), the Court forcefully limited
the doctrine by stating that although an assignor of a patent could not attack the
validity of the patent, he could introduce evidence to narrow claims made therein with
regard to the issue of infringement. Casco Products Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 116
F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1940), limited the doctrine further, permitting a licensee to




pel doctrine with resounding finality." It held that a licensee is not
estopped from challenging the validity of the patent which forms the
basis for the license granted to him by the patentee."
The Court explicitly noted that the decision was dictated by the
policy encouraging early challenges to the validity of a patent.8° This
policy, the Court pointed out, was a necessary result of the broad
policy, recently emphasized in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co."
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.," of ensuring to the
public the free use of ideas in general circulation. Although the Court
did not enter into any general considerations of the patent system, it
should be emphasized that this policy is of course a natural concom-
itant of the constitutional mandate to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." aa
Indeed, the nature of the patent grant is intimately related to this
policy. A patent is a privilege," limited in time," which is granted by
licensor's patent. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 257 (1945),
the Supreme Court, resting its decision on patent policy, further modified the doctrine.
The Court prevented the assignee of a patent from invoking estoppel against the
assignor where the assignor, defendant to a suit for infringement, claimed that the
alleged infringing device was really covered by another patent which had expired.
Further inroads were made on the basis of antitrust principles. In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jeffer-
son Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 175-77 (1942), the Court held that where a licensing agree-
ment based upon an invalid patent would be in restraint of trade, licensee estoppel
could not be used to preclude an investigation into the validity of the patent. Similarly,
the Court in Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg, Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400-01
(1947), and MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947),
declined to estop a licensee from challenging the validity of the patent where the licensing
agreement contained a price-fixing clause.
This steady decline in use of the doctrine was briefly interrupted by Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950), which seemingly
revitalized the doctrine as "the general rule." However, Hazeltine was expressly over-
ruled by the Supreme Court in Lear. 395 U.S. at 671.
The history of the doctrine is well-documented. See, e.g., Note, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
386 (1970); Note, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 279 (1970); Note, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 872
(1970); Note, 48 N.C.L. Rev. 391 (1970).
28 395 U.S. at 671.
29 Id. at 670-71.
80 Id. at 668, 670, 673-74.
81 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
32 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
89 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
84 "Privilege," as used herein, conforms to the definition proposed in W. Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (W. Cook ed. 1919). Hohfeld categorizes the legal rela-
tions which may arise between two persons, distinguishing the concepts of "right" and
"privilege." If a person holds a right, then, as a corollary, someone else owes a duty
to him. The bolder of the right can enforce it against the bearer of the duty. Id. at 38.
In contrast, a person may hold a privilege. A privilege to act presupposes the absence
of a duty to refrain from acting. The exercise of the privilege does not invade the
rights of another party. Other parties possess a "no-right" to performance by the
holder of the privilege. Id. at 38-39.
Applying this theory to the issuance of a patent, the patentee may be designated as
P, and the general public as G. G has a right to the free use of those Ideas In general
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the federal government to the inventor of a sufficiently creative idea."
In return for this privilege the inventor provides a prompt and com-
plete disclosure of his invention to the ultimate benefit of technology. 87
The patent grant encourages the research and development necessary
for the proliferation of invention by tendering an exclusive opportunity
to exploit the patented idea commercially." Moreover, by offering
investors a unique opportunity to participate in a commercially profit-
able venture, the patent induces them to supply the risk capital neces-
sary to make a patented idea available for public use."
However, the temporary grant of exclusive use is but one element
of the patent system. Besides rewarding inventiveness and promoting
disclosure, the Lear Court stressed the safeguards simultaneously af-
forded by the system to the public's right to free and competitive use
of unpatentable ideas belonging in the public domain." One method of
pursuing the latter policy is the encouragement of prompt challenges to
improperly granted patents.
It was this aspect of patent policy that the Lear Court developed
in laying to rest the doctrine of licensee estoppel. The Court reasoned
that an essential tool for weeding out specious patents from the patent
system was the early challenge to the validity of the patent, brought in
the adversary context of a lawsuit.' Licensee estoppel impeded such
early challenges. Moreover, an estopped licensee, who is normally the
only party with sufficient interest to challenge a patent's validity,
could be forced to pay tribute to an invalid patent, with attendant
circulation and not protected by a patent. Accordingly, P has a duty not to arrogate
those ideas for his exclusive use. However, P may acquire the limited privilege of exclu-
sive use of a sufficiently creative idea. This privilege stems from the patent grant. Ac-
cordingly, G may be said to have a no-right against P's use of the privilege as long as
P's conduct is confined to the boundaries of the privilege. However, P has a duty not to
impair G's right to the free use of ideas belonging in the public domain. In addition, P
has the right to exclude use of the patented idea by G. Cast in other terms, G has a
duty not to infringe P's patent.
85 35 U.S.C. a 154 (1970) provides in part: "Every patent shall contain . . .
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years . . . of the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States .. . ."
38 The invention must satisfy the statutory criteria of patentability. An invention
is patentable if it is new and useful, novel, and non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. ff 101-03 (1970).
For discussion of the standards employed in determining the prerequisites to non-
obviousness, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1966), and United States
v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48-52 (1966).
87 Baskin, An Area of Confusion: Patents, Monopolies and the Antitrust Laws, 45
J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 741, 745-46 (1963).
38
 See Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 85 Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review of the Patent System 56
(Comm. Print 1958) (Remarks of Prof. Machlup) [hereinafter Mach'up].
89
 Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: the Search for a Unitary Theory, 35 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 512, 515 (1967); Machlup, note 38 supra.
46 395 U.S. at 668, 670, 673-74.
41 Id. at 673-74.
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adverse competitive consequences to the community as a whole." The
Court sought to supply the licensee with economic incentive to bring
an early challenge to invalid patents and thereby protect these public
interests. Accordingly, Lear permitted the licensee to suspend payment
of all royalties upon repudiation of the license, pending adjudication
of the issue of validity." Unless the financial burden of simultaneously
paying royalties and litigation costs were lifted from the shoulders of
the licensee, he might be discouraged from engaging in litigation."
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation," a case decided after Lear, the Supreme Court provided
further stimulus to the licensee. The Court there held, in accordance
with Lear, that procedural obstacles to suits brought by those disposed
to challenge the validity of patents should be eliminated in order to
avoid use of the patent as a means of propagating economic coercion
and insulating from free public use ideas disclosed but not worthy of
patent protection."
42 Id. at 673.
48 Id. at 670-71, 674.
44 Id. at 673-74. Arguably, suspension of royalty payments prior to an actual adjudi-
cation of invalidity constitutes a deprivation of the licensor's property without due
process of law. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme Court held that
procedural due process required that a welfare recipient be afforded an evidentiary
hearing before termination of welfare payments. The Court there found a post-termination
"fair hearing" inadequate despite the fact that a recipient who prevailed at such a hearing
would recover all funds erroneously withheld. Goldberg turned on the theory that the
recipient's interest in avoiding the loss of benefits outweighed the governmental interest
in employing summary proceedings to terminate fraudulent welfare claims quickly and
with minimal fiscal and administrative expenditures. The welfare payments were likely
to constitute the sole support of the recipient.
The recipient's right to welfare benefits may be likened to the right of a licensor
to payments on the license. Depending upon the outcome of the balancing test used
by the Court in Goldberg, suspension of royalty payments may not be justified prior to
judicial determination of the validity of the patent. However, contrasted to the over-
riding dependence of the welfare recipient, a licensor may well be able to afford the
temporary suspension of royalty payments. Furthermore, suspension of royalty payments
serves the paramount federal purpose of inducing early challenges to the validity of a
patent. The scales appear to tip most definitely against the licensor. Therefore procedural
due process should not require guaranteeing a pre-suspension hearing to the licensor.
Lear and Goldberg, then, appear reconcilable.
48 402 U.S. 313 (1971),
48
 Id. at 338. The precise holding in Blonder abrogated the doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel in suits for patent infringement as set forth in Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638,
642 (1936). Blonder provided that a prior decision of invalidity between the licensor
and a third party may collaterally estop the licensor from establishing the validity of
the patent in a subsequent suit for infringement against the licensee. 402 U.S. at 350.
The case also considered at great length the harmful economic effects flowing from the
imposition of procedural obstacles to challenges of specious patients. Briefly, these
effects are: the waste of time and money to both the parties and to the court in relitigating
an issue once properly decided, especially when the resources of the litigants could
otherwise be channeled into further research and development, id. at 334-38, and the
anticompetitive effects inflicted when one infringer must absorb royalties and lose profits,
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The district court in Troxel utilized the statement of the Court in
Lear that a licensee is entitled to avoid payment of all royalties.accru-
ing after the issuance of the patent if the patent be shown invalid.'
On the narrow circumstances in Lear, the licensee was entitled (1) to
suspend all royalty payments accruing after the issuance of the patent
and (2) to avoid those payments absolutely if he could show the patent
to be invalid.' Applying the Lear policy to the facts of Troxel, the
district court argued that Troxel, who had paid royalties pursuant to
a licensing agreement entered into after the patent had issued, was
entitled to recover all royalty payments when the patent was subse-
quently found invalid."
It is submitted that the court of appeals was correct in deciding
that the district court, in failing to distinguish the factual situation in
Lear from that before it, distorted the federal policy enunciated in
Lear. The court of appeals ruled that the general statements in Lear
were limited by the particular facts of that case: notably, in Lear, re-
pudiation of the license occurred before issuance of the patent." Upon
issuance of the patent, Adkins initated the action against Lear, and
only then was the issue of validity presented for adjudication. The sus-
pension of royalty payments was viewed as a means of encouraging
Adkins to undertake the expensive business of litigating this issue, and
upon proof of invalidity the licensee was released from any obligation
to make these or future payments to the patentee. In contrast to the
facts in Lear, Troxel entered into the license after the patent had is-
sued." Hence the date of issuance of the patent did not signify the ad-
vent of litigation in Troxel as it had in Lear.
In Lear, the Supreme Court permitted the licensee to avoid royalty
payments after the issuance of the patent in order to provide the
requisite incentive for an early and effective challenge to its validity:
by suspending royalty payments, Lear could use the retained funds to
finance the litigation required to declare the patent invalid."
However, it must be stressed that in Lear the Court could not
have been focusing upon the issuance of the patent per se as the event
after which a licensee could avoid royalty payments. Rather, the Court
appeared to regard the act of repudiation—inasmuch as that act is
necessarily correlative with undertaking litigation—as the watershed
while another possesses sufficient financial resources to resist the economic thrusts of a
patentee. Id. at 346.
47 334 F. Supp. at 1271.
48 The precise language of Lear was: "[Lear] must be permitted to avoid payment
of all royalties accruing after Adkins' ... patent issued if Lear can prove patent in-
validity." 395 U.S. at 674 (emphasis supplied).
45 334 F. Supp. at 1270-71.
50
 175 U.S.P.Q. at 69. Lear repudiated the licensing agreement two years before
the patent issued. Thus, the suspension of royalty payments in Lear extended over the
entire life of the patent. In other words, Lear had never paid royalties under the
patent, all payments having been made under a pre-patent agreement.
51 175 U.S.P.Q. at 66.
62 395 U.S. at 673-74.
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event no matter when it occurs. This conclusion seems to be required
by the Court's warning that the case before it, involving a pre-patent
licensing agreement repudiated before the patent issued, was not "the
one which arises in the most common licensing context."'8 Presumably
the cases which are "most common" are those like Troxel, wherein the
patent is issued before the agreement is repudiated. In such cases, using
the issuance of the patent as the event from which avoidance—and
hence recoupment—should run would not serve the federal patent
policy that is the basis of the Lear rationale: the encouragement of
early challenges by a licensee to patent validity. Rather, that policy is
served by allowing avoidance to begin when the licensee takes the
decisive step of repudiation. Conversely, to permit a licensee, upon
proof of patent invalidity, to recover royalties paid prior to repudiation
—as the district court would have done—does not motivate the licensee
to repudiate earlier than he would do in the absence of such recoup-
ment privileges. It is submitted, then, that the Sixth Circuit was cor-
rect in holding that Lear does not confer upon the licensee the right to
recover payments made to the licensor before repudiation of the license.
Having set straight the district court's rather crooked construc-
tion of the policy espoused in Lear, the Sixth Circuit in Troxel then
considered the drastic consequences which might result from recoup-
ment. First, the court noted disapprovingly that, in seeking recoup-
ment, Troxel relied on a prior adjudication of invalidity in a suit to
which it had been a stranger." The court predicted that the ultimate
effect of permitting recoupment to a licensee who so relied would be to
encourage dilatory tactics on the part of the licensee, who would
naturally prefer to reap the benefits of third party adjudication without
himself sowing the seeds of litigation." Moreover, the court argued,
even if no third party materialized to challenge the validity of the
patent, a licensee would be encouraged to refrain from litigating the
issue of validity until the end of the patent's term was so near that the
risk of injunction" was minimal." At that point the licensee could
begin litigation, hoping to recover all past royalties, after enjoying many
years of protection from the license.'" Hence the court reasoned that
recoupment, especially in conjunction with third party litigation,
would discourage an early adjudication of the issue of validity and so
would run counter to the policy expressed in Lear."
In taking heed of this potential for delay by reliance on third
party adjudication, the court failed to consider that the Supreme Court
had authoritatively established in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
5a Id. at 671.
54 175 U.S.P.Q. at 68.
55 Id.
50 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1970) provides that an injunction may be granted to prevent
the violation of any right secured by a patent.
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v. University of Illinois Foundation that third party adjudications of a
patent's invalidity may be given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent
litigation by another party against the same patentee." Assuming
arguendo that the Blonder rule could encourage the licensee to post-
pone litigating the issue of validity of the patent, it is submitted that
this "disincentive effect" could be eliminated by requiring that a
licensee who pleads estoppel show that, in light of all the circumstances,
the estoppel defense is exercised with diligence and for good cause,
consonant with both the policies of the patent system and those justify-
ing use of the plea.°' The licensee would have to bear the cost of a
full-scale trial of the issue of validity if he had not, in good faith,
sought expeditiously to challenge the patent.
Such a precaution, however, may be unnecessary, since a "fence-
sitting" strategy is of questionable value to the licensee. After Blonder,
if a patent is adjudicated invalid in a prior suit, a competitor of the
licensee, who before Blonder may have been persuaded by the prospect
of an enforceable patent to refrain from competition with the licensee,
may now free himself with minimal cost from the patentee's strangle-
hold.°2
 The nominal cost of obtaining summary judgment on the issue
of patent validity, based on collateral estoppel, would not be a signifi-
cant obstacle to a challenge of the patent. Accordingly, any attempt by
the licensee to postpone litigation in order to preserve the aura of
enforceability of the patent and so attenuate competition will be fruit-
less, since his competitors will not be deterred from using the patent by
the cost of an infringement suit which may be summarily adjudicated.
As a matter of fact, unless the licensee acts with dispatch to attack the
patent he will be set back competitively, since he alone is encumbered
with royalty obligations under the license.
The disincentive that theoretically could result from collateral
estoppel, then, appears to pose no real threat to the policy of early
challenges established in Lear. A broader question remains: does
recoupment, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned, necessarily encourage dila-
tory tactics on the part of a licensee to the detriment of the Lear policy?
It is submitted that the facts in Troxel indicate only part of the answer.
Troxel exhibited a remarkable reluctance to litigate the issue of validity
of the patent. Even after another litigant had mounted a successful
challenge of the Schwinn patent, Troxel continued to pay royalties
under the license," an indication that Troxel found life under the
60 402 U.S. at 350.
61 See discussion of this proposal in the class action context in Comment, Class
Actions in Suits for Patent Infringement in Light of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1473, 1498-99 (1972).
02 Unless the licensor can show that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the validity of a patent in a prior suit in which the patent was adjudged invalid,
any party sued for infringement by the licensor will be able to avail himself of collateral
estoppel and obtain summary judgment on the issue of validity. 402 U.S. at 333.
63 175 U.S.P.Q. at 70. Blonder had not yet come down when the district court
decided Troxel. Consequently, Troxel could not repudiate and avoid a full-scale trial on
510
CASE NOTES
agreement to be quite satisfactory. There, Troxel enjoyed freedom
from liability for alleged past infringement, as well as Schwinn's agree-
ment to protect Troxel against prospective unlicensed infringers.
Troxel, then, had the benefit of the use of Schwinn's idea to the exclu-
sion of non-licensed competition." It is not unlikely that Troxel found
it advantageous to uphold the facade of enforceability of the patent in
order to maintain a competitive edge over other manufacturers.
However, in a different market, where a licensee is surrounded by
competitors disposed to ignore the patent," he cannot afford such for-
bearance. To the extent that a licensee must pay royalties for the use
of an unpatentable idea pursuant to a licensing agreement, while other
manufacturers who had not entered into similar agreements with the
patentee may use the idea without commensurate expenditures of
capital, the licensee may suffer a severe competitive disadvantage.°°
In short, hesitation to challenge the validity of a patent depends upon
the security of the licensee's competitive position, in turn a function
of both the strength of the patent and the level of competition in the
market. It is suggested, first, that if recoupment discourages hasty
judicial assault upon a strong valid' patent, this is commendable, since
judicial economy is served thereby and valid patents lie outside the
ambit of Lear anyway. Lear aimed its arrows at specious patents. And
secondly, in a competitive climate, weak patents, which we may assume
are likely to be invalid, cannot be allowed to go unchallenged by the
licensee. Presumably a licensee operating in such an atmosphere will
have to bring an early challenge to the patent's validity, whether or not
he is given recoupment. The possibility of recoupment will represent
only an additional benefit to be attained if his suit is successful.
Finally, in view of the probability that after Blonder collateral
estoppel may be liberally applied by competitors of the licensee against
a patentee who seeks to reestablish the validity of a patent previously
adjudicated invalid, an early challenge to the patent by the licensee is
all the more likely. Hence, while recoupment may conceivably limit
the eagerness of a licensee to mount an attack against the patent where
the market is sluggish and where the patent is more than frail, the
possibility of recoupment will not necessarily persuade a licensee to
postpone litigation until near the expiration of the patent. The Sixth
the issue of validity, summary judgment not being likely. Arguably, this deterred
True] from repudiating the license.
04 Moreover, the fact that Troxel continued to pay royalties would indicate that the
business derived from use of Schwinn's invention was rather profitable. Cf. Pollack
v. Angelus Block Co., 171 U.S.P.Q. 182, 185, No. 882198 (Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 7,
1971).
05 For purposes of the accompanying textual discussion we may assume that there
has been no prior adjudication of invalidity so that Blonder does not apply. Taking
Blonder into consideration, that is, taking the effect of collateral estoppel based on a
prior adjudication of invalidity into account, the conclusions reached would be
strengthened. See text at note 66 infra.
00 334 F. Supp. at 1271. However, the licensee to a pre-patent licensing agreement
may receive the benefit of a "tooling-up" period withheld from its competitors.
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Circuit's assumption that such postponement will be a necessary result
of recoupment appears incorrect.
It must be admitted, then, that the prospect of recovery of royalty
payments made prior to repudiation may in certain circumstances have
no effect upon the disposition of a licensee to challenge the patent's
validity. This admission, however, does not appear to qualify signifi-
cantly the essence of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning: that in many cir-
cumstances recoupment would encourage the licensee to delay litigation
and to that extent weaken the functioning of the patent system.
The appellate court, however, did not rely solely on the argument
of delayed litigation. Its rationale pointed to other corollaries of recoup-
ment that would threaten the very roots of the patent system. The
court argued that if all royalties received were subject to eventual
reclamation by the licensee barring the expiration of an appropriate
statute of limitations,' the licensor would be forced to retain funds
sufficient to cover such contingent liability. 88 Where there are several
licensing agreements based on the same patent, this liability would be
amplified because all licensees might sue individually or as a class to
recover past royalties paid under the various agreements."' The court
found further objectionable consequences. Any licensor owning more
than one patent would be likely to demand higher royalties for licensing
agreements based on diverse patents in order to protect himself against
possible suit for recoupment under any one of the agreements." In
addition, under the federal tax laws, these royalties might be taxable
as ordinary income to the licensor." Such taxes, coupled with the ever-
present threat of recoupment, which in turn would limit the kinds of
investments the licensor could make, would discourage all but the
wealthiest licensor?' Thus the court concluded that the possibility of
costly recoupment suits, together with the resulting impediment to
07 Generally, the state statutes of limitations for actions in contract is six years from
the time the cause of action accrued. See, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 1972);
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2 (1959); Tenn. Code § 28-309 (1955).
08 175 U.S.P.Q, at 68.
00 In a class action against Carter-Wallace, Inc., filed on February 25, 1972 by
Zenith Laboratories in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
the patentee was sued for $130 million in royalties paid by the licensees under the sixteen-
year-old patent. The suit was filed one week after the patent had been declared invalid.
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 29, 1972, at 12, col. 2.
To 175 U.S.P.Q. at 68.
71 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1235, provides capital gains treatment for royalties
based upon a transfer of "all substantial rights to a patent." See, e.g., Fawick v. Com-
missioner, 436 F.2d 655, 663 (6th Cir. 1971). An exclusive license may qualify for this
treatment, but a non-exclusive license will not. Thus, royalties under non-exclusive
licenses will be taxable as ordinary income to the licensor. See, e.g., Reschelberg v.
United States, 330 F.2d 56, 60-62 (6th Cir. 1964); Redler Conveyor Co. v. Commissioner,
303 F.2d 567, 568-69 (1st Cir, 1962); Gruber v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 510, 513-14
(D. Ore. 1958); 5 CCH 1973 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. § 4745.40. And royalties under the
non-exclusive license are deductible business expenses to the licensee. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 162(a)(3); 2 CCH 1973 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ir 1382.511.
72 175 U.S.P.Q. at 68.
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many forms of investment of royalty payments, would tend to make a
patent licensing agreement an impractical venture. Consequently, quite
aside from the possible effects of recoupment on licensees' motivation
to bring early challenges, the severe blow which would be dealt indus-
try by discouraging use of a major instrument of commercial exploita-
tion—the patent licensing agreement—justifies denial of the remedy
of recoupment. Only if other means for commercial exploitation of an
invention could take up the slack created by a neglected patent system
might this argument against recoupment be adequately countered.
Assessing this danger, the court observed that recoupment would
discourage an inventor from turning to the patent system in the first
instance in seeking to exploit an idea commercially." The court held
that the virtual uselessness of the licensing agreement to the patentee
threatened with recoupment would forestall indefinitely the patentee's
public disclosure of his invention. An inventor threatened by the danger
that he might have to restore all royalties might well resort to other,
more secure means of exploiting his invention, namely trade secret
agreements. 74 Of course, it must be admitted that, where the patent is
specious, foreclosing the patentee from use of the commercial channels
at the heart of the patent system is commendable. At the same time,
the commercial utility of the idea may be realized through the use of
trade secret law and so benefit technology. Where, however, the idea is
worthy of the patent grant" and the patentee has the very real choice
of patent or trade secret protection, recoupment may retard drastically
technological progress by prompting him to choose the latter.
It is submitted, then, that a significant drawback of recoupment
is the threat that it poses to the federal patent system. The Sixth Circuit
only adumbrated the potential consequences, and this note will en-
deavor to explicate them by indicating how recoupment would dis-
courage use of the federal patent system, thereby encouraging inventors
to utilize instead a relatively deficient system of trade secret law. The
arguments generated in the judicial decisions concerning preemption
Ta Id.
74 Trade secret status exists when the subject matter is used continuously in
business, is not generally known or readily ascertainable and is maintained with due re-
gard to protecting secrecy. Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939) ; R.
Milgrim, 12 Business Organizations: Trade Secrets §§ 2.01-.09 (1972) ; Marmorek, The
Inventor's Common-Law Rights Today, 50 J. Pat. Off, Soc'y 369, 375-81 (1968). The
courts generally view trade secrets as property. E.g., New Method Laundry Co. v.
MaeCann, 174 Cal. 26, 31, 161 P. 990, 991 (1916). The value of the trade secret depends
substantially upon the secrecy with which it is maintained. E.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961). In the absence of secrecy,
the "property" disappears. Cf. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
The major disadvantage of trade secret protection to the owner is that proper disclosure
of the secret is possible and this may result in heightened competition with the owner
or even forfeiture of trade secret status. Id. at 375. See text at notes 89-105 infra.
75 Every patent grant is accompanied by a statutory presumption of validity and
the burden of establishing invalidity rests on the party asserting the defense. 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (1970). However, this presumption may be primarily honored in the breach. See,
e.g., note 130 infra; Comment, supra note 61, at 1476 n.25.
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of trade secret law by federal patent law support this thesis." Absent
recoupment, trade secret law and the patent system are poised in a
favorable balance that facilitates fulfillment of the constitutional pur-
pose of fostering technological progress." However, recoupment dis-
turbs this desirable equilibrium between the patent system and trade
secret law.
The question of preemption of state trade secret law by the patent
laws, once a raging controversy, is illuminated by two Supreme Court
decisions not dealing directly with trade secrets. In Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v Stiffel Co." and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,"
the Supreme Court held that a state cannot, under veil of unfair com-
petition laws, provide protection of the type "that clashes with the ob-
jectives of the federal patent law."" Thus the Court held that a state
could not prohibit the copying of a marketed article that was unpatent-
able despite a resultant likelihood of source confusion, since that in-
junction frustrates paramount and uniform federal standards of patent-
ability.'
On the facts before the Court, Sears and Compco held merely that
an unpatentable product which has been disclosed to the public can be
copied freely by anyone." Unfortunately, the language employed by
the Court proved susceptible to a broader construction. With respect to
unpatentable ideas, the Court feared that state laws like the one before
it, "could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty
to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards."'
To the unwary these words might purport to mandate the dedication of
all unpatentable ideas, disclosed or secret, to the public domain.
The seed planted in Sears and Compco was nourished in Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins. Lear, in abolishing the state doctrine of licensee estoppel as
applied to patent licensing agreements, brought the delicate balance
between trade secret and patent law into sharper focus." There the
Supreme Court took pains to point out that licensing agreements could
occur at two distinct points in time." Accordingly, the Court first con-
sidered licensing agreements negotiated after the issuance of the patent.
Secondly, the Court examined licensing agreements entered into before
issuance of the patent, i.e., during the gestation period of the patent. In
76 See text at notes 77-98 infra.
77 See, e.g., Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: of Whales and Other Matters, 46
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 17 (1971).
78
 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
79 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
80 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 (footnote omitted).
81 376 U.S. at 230-31. See, e.g., Note, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears
and Cotnpco, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 101 (1965); Note, 50 Cornell L.Q. 118 (1964); Note, 6
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 138 (1964).
82 Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-31. The Compco opinion repeats the Scars holding. Id. at
237-38.
83
 Id. at 232.
84
 395 U.S. at 674.
86 Id. at 669, 671.
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considering the latter, which is of concern here, the Court drew upon
trade secret law. Thus the Court cautioned: "At the core of this [pre-
patent license] is the difficult question whether federal patent policy
bars a State from enforcing a contract regulating access to an unpat-
ented secret idea."" But the Court sidestepped the issue, remanding
to the state court "to reconsider the theoretical basis of their decisions
enforcing the contractual rights of inventors [it being] impossible to
predict the extent to which this re-evaluation may revolutionize the
law of any particular State in this regard."" Despite the opinion of the
majority, a minority of the Court found state trade secret law to pose
so significant a threat to the federal patent system as to warrant the
former's preemption on the basis of Sears and Comixo: "The national
policy expressed in the patent laws . . . cannot be frustrated by private
agreements among individuals, with or without the approval of the
State.""
Trade secrets and patents represent alternative means of exploit-
ing an idea and, as will be shown, each strongly reinforces the other.
Sears, Cornpco, and Lear, however, generated considerable confusion
concerning the permissible bounds of trade secret law. In the wake of
these decisions, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. that fed-
eral patent law preempted state trade secret law, so that an inventor
must submit his idea to the Patent Office before licensing the use of his
idea." The Second Circuit promptly reversed. In reversing, the Second
Circuit reestablished the inventor's long-standing right to exploit his
invention by private agreement." The court held that any idea not
patented may be exploited by the use of state trade secret agreements."
Although the inventor of a patentable idea may seek the fuller protec-
tion of a patent, the court declined to impose an obligation to do so. Nor
did the court deny trade secret protection to unpatentable ideas."
The Second Circuit's analysis of the interrelationship between the
patent and trade secret laws was directed at the issue of preemption
spawned by Sears and Compco and nurtured by Lear, but it sets the
stage for consideration of the Sixth Circuit's objection to recoupment."
The grounds for this objection were not fully presented by the court.
However, it is submitted that the following analysis of the effect of
86 Id. at 672 (footnote omitted).
87 Id. at 675.
88 Id. at 677.
80 309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court, however, left open the question
of whether the licensor could demand royalties for use of the idea pending issuance of the .
patent once an application had been filed. Id.
00 Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 309 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court politely chastised the rather broad holding of
the court below made "without benefit of brief or argument from the parties who had
been concerned solely [with another unrelated issue] . ..." Id. at 221.
81 Id. at 222 n.2, 225.
92 Id. at 225.
98 See text at notes 78-88 supra.
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recoupment on the relationship between patents and trade secrets
will prove the court's general observations to be correct. The Second
Circuit briefly pointed out that, should an inventor know his idea to be
unpatentable, he would naturally choose the vehicle of the confidential
agreement, which would allow only the very limited disclosure per-
mitted by trade secret law." However, if instead the idea were sub-
mitted to the Patent Office, no patent could issue and no disclosure
could result." If trade secret protection is denied this inventor, he is
likely to hoard his idea to prevent any disclosure. The trade secret
agreement, then, offers a commercially attractive method of using the
unpatentable idea, thus augmenting the mainstream of invention which
nourishes science and the useful arts." On the other hand, by affording
protection to an unpatentable idea, trade secret law threatens to under-
mine federal standards of patentability, a major concern of the Court
in Sears and Compco." However, in light of the limited protection
offered by trade secret agreements" and the benefits to be derived from
the commercial exploitation of unpatentable ideas, this minor incursion
into the zones of free competition and uniform standards of patent-
ability seems tolerable.
In seeking refuge under the cloak of trade secret law, the inventor
acquires minimal protection for his invention, since he binds only the
licensee to a confidential agreement °p The inventor has no recourse
against a third party who might legally discover and use the inven-
tion.'°° in contrast, a patent bars everyone but the patentee from using
the idea during the term of the patent, even in the event of independent
discovery, in return for full disclosure of the idea. 101 Thus, where the
idea is patentable, the inventor is likely to resort to the federal system
in order to secure the significantly greater protection of the patent
grant.'" A favorable balance exists, then, between trade secret and
patent law. An unpatentable idea may be exploited by a trade secret
agreement, and patentable ideas will invariably be exploited under the
aegis of the patent system. This equilibrium means that, far from
retarding disclosure of commercially useful ideas, trade secret law
ensures maximal disclosure. Moreover, pending issuance of the patent
grant, the trade secret agreement supplies a method for immediate
exploitation of the patentable but not yet patented idea, i.e., a "head
" 442 F.2d at 224.
95 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970) prescribes the confidential status of applications. 37
C.F.R. § 1.14 (1972) provides in part: "(Pleading patent applications are preserved in
secrecy."
96 Cf. 442 F.2d at 224.
97 376 U.S. at 230-31 (footnote omitted).
98 See text at notes 99-101 infra.
99 Restatement of Torts § 757, at 13-14 (1939).
100 Id., g 758.
101 35 U.S.C. 271 (1970).
102 Moreover, an inventor must apply for a patent within a year after he begins




start."' Thus, in conjunction with the patent system, trade secret
law provides significant impetus for technological development."'
However, trade secret law standing alone could not guarantee the in-
centive for invention and disclosure requisite for the most complete
technological advances.
It is therefore submitted that recoupment would destroy the pres-
ent equilibrium between trade secret and patent law. In order to avoid
the threat of recoupment, inventors in great numbers might feel com-
pelled to choose the trade secret agreement regardless of the patentabil-
ity of their ideas, relying on the fact that, as long as the other party to
the agreement did not breach the confidential relationship and indepen-
dent discoveries did not materialize, the inventors would enjoy per-
petually exclusive markets rather than the temporary exclusiveness
granted by patents. 106
 With the scale thus tipped in the favor of trade
secrets, the patent system would then tend to be bypassed, with conse-
quent impact upon the direction and tempo of technology. And trade
secret law alone cannot serve the needs of technology—industry and
commerce must suffer, since only patent law requires full disclosure
of inventions. Thus the Sixth Circuit had good reason to fear the ad-
verse effects which recoupment would have on the fine balance between
state trade secret and federal patent law.
In short, trade secret law complements the patent system and, in
juxtaposition, the two bodies of law encourage the invention and the
utilization of all commercially feasible ideas, with minimal adverse
competitive effects and maximal disclosure; however, were the patent
system to be reduced to a relatively insubstantial role by introduction
of the remedy of recoupment, trade secret law would prove incapable
of supplying the impetus necessary to ensure the progress of science
and the useful arts.
After assessing recoupment in terms of its probable effects on
early challenges, its limitations on the investment possibilities of the
licensor, and its upset of the delicate balance between trade secret and
federal patent law, the Sixth Circuit considered the possibility of re-
163 Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Anti-
trust Supremacy, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1432, 1447 (1967); Adelman & Jaress, Inventions
and the Law of Trade Secrets after Lear v. Adkins, 16 Wayne L. Rev. 77, 88 (1969).
Until the public is able to discover the trade secret, the licensee decidedly has a competi-
tive advantage. The immediate commercial use of the idea is thereby encouraged. Thus,
the inventor receives a reward of pre-patent royalties for permitting the licensee to
"tool up" for commercial production prior to issuance of the patent. If a licensee were
able to recover all of his royalty payments after the patent application was rejected or
the patent granted was later declared invalid, then the licensor would be reluctant to
enter into such a pre-patent licensing agreement and "headstarts" would evaporate.
104 Further, trade secrets serve social policy well by discouraging unscrupulous
business practices ranging from fraud to interference with advantageous business rela-
tions. Doerfer, supra note 103, at 1450.
105 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829); Adelman, Trade Secrets
and Federal Pre-Emption—The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y
713, 729 (1967).
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coupment in light of the eviction doctrine. The court reasoned that
"public interest [was] adequately protected under Lear without im-
posing on the patent holder the obligation to refund royalties paid
under the license of a patent procured and asserted in good faith. ' 1"
In propounding the adequacy of Lear in this respect, the court at-
tempted to reconcile this Supreme Court decision with the Sixth Cir-
cuit doctrine of eviction' as developed in Drackett Chemical Co. v.
Chamberlain Co."' Drackett involved circumstances quite similar to
those in Troxel. Drackett and Chamberlain had entered into a licens-
ing agreement based on a Chamberlain patent. The two companies, as
joint plaintiffs, brought suit against Babbitt for infringement of the
patent. The district court that heard the case indicated at a hearing that
the Chamberlain patent did not cover the Babbitt product. Drackett
then notified Chamberlain that it would cease royalty payments if the
patent were held invalid. The district court ultimately adjudged the
patent invalid, and this decision precipitated the suit between Drackett
and Chamberlain?" Quoting Judge Learned Hand, the Sixth Circuit
outlined the doctrine of eviction: "It is quite true that a licensee may
not dispute the validity of a patent in a suit for royalties . . . though
the contrary is the case after decree of invalidity in another suit." 11°
The court further explained that the adjudication of invalidity by an-
other court triggers "a complete failure of consideration—an eviction
—which should justify a termination of the contract." 111 However the
court continued: "Prior to such eviction, the mere invalidity of the
patent is properly held not to be a sufficient defense . . — 17112
The district court in Troxel, confronted with claims by Troxel
that eviction occurred as of the date of the Ohio District Court decision
of invalidity and conflicting claims by Schwinn that eviction could
occur only as of the affirmance of that decision by the Ninth Circuit,
evaded the issue entirely, holding that Lear required restoration of all
royalties regardless of eviction 113 The Sixth Circuit resolved the issue
by holding that Lear superseded the Drackett doctrine with respect to
the date of eviction. Under Drackett, a licensee would be permitted to
suspend royalty payments only following eviction, i.e., a final adjudica-
tion of invalidity 114 In contrast, under Lear, a licensee would be
permitted to repudiate and cease royalty payments at any time, secure
in the knowledge that the validity of the patent could be effectively
100 175 1J.S.P.Q. at 70.
107 Id. at 69.
100 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933). The facts recounted are taken from the court of
appeals opinion, id. at 854-55.
100 There appears to be no report of this district court opinion. The court of appeals
discusses it at 63 F.2d at 855.
110
 Id. at 854 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
111 Id.
112 Id. (emphasis supplied).
in 334 F. Supp. at 1270.
1 " See text at notes 111-12 supra.
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challenged upon suit by the licensor for unpaid royalties."' There need
not be a prior adjudication of invalidity. Thus Lear, in not limiting the
licensee to repudiation subsequent to a third party adjudication of
invalidity, is more expansive in scope than Drackett. However, the two
opinions are reconcilable to the extent that royalties must be paid up
to the date of repudiation in both cases. Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted
that Blonder, in permitting a licensee to assert the defense of collateral
estoppel (based on a third party adjudication of invalidity) in a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, also changes the Drackett rule
somewhat. Thus, in contrast to Drackett, where repudiation is per-
mitted only after a final third party adjudication of invalidity, Blonder
permits repudiation prior to an adjudication of invalidity, which may
be obtained subsequently in summary fashion. Nevertheless, the Sixth
Circuit insisted upon maintaining the doctrine of eviction and utilized
it in reaching its decision that royalties could not be recovered up to the
date of repudiation, even though the doctrine's goal of lessening the
burdensome effect of licensee estoppel was accomplished by the action
of the Supreme Court in Lear and Blonder 11e
The essence of the Sixth Circuit's decision was its holding that re-
coupment, as the district court wished to employ it, conflicted with
federal patent policy. Under basic preemption doctrine, 111
 then, the
remedy could not be allowed to stand."' It is submitted, however, that
the appellate court could have reached the same result simply by
evaluating the district court's remedy in terms of fundamental contract
doctrine."'
The recoupment remedy proposed by the district court was, of
course, a remedy tantamount to restitution. Under principles of state
116 See note 48 supra.
119 See text at notes 41-46 supra. The Sixth Circuit held that Lear overruled Drackett
to the extent that the latter prohibited suspension of royalty payments prior to a third
party adjudication of invalidity. 175 U.S.P.Q. at 69. In addition, referring to the facts
in Drackett, viz., that the third party adjudication there had not been appealed and so
had become final, the court held that the doctrine enunciated therein depended upon
final adjudications of invalidity. Id. at 66. It followed that, in the instant case, the
adjudication became final upon affirmance by the Ninth Circuit. Id.
117 For general consideration of the preemption doctrine, see Mishkin, The Various-
ness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1957) ; Note, The Competence of Federal
Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1084 (1964).
118
 The Sixth Circuit nowhere used the term preemption, but that concept is of
course at the heart of the holding that recoupment was an inappropriate remedy to the
extent that it conflicted with federal policy.
119
 Of course, state contract Iaw does not apply if it collides with paramount federal
law. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2. Lear abolished the narrow contract doctrine of licensee
estoppel only. 395 U.S. at 668, 674. And Painton expressly reserved to the states the
power to enforce trade secret agreements. 442 F.2d at 225. Thus, until Travel, the usual
principles of state contract law applied to the Iaw of patent conveyancing. Hearings
on S. 643 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 264-85 (1971) (testimony of
Assistant U.S. Att'y. Gen. R. McLaren).
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contract law, a licensee may seek rescission and restitution of royalties
based upon the licensor's breach.'" In providing relief to the licensee
the court's objective would be to restore the licensee, as the aggrieved
party, to the position that he occupied before the contract was made. 12"
This would be accomplished by requiring the licensor to restore the
royalties that he had received from the injured party.' However, the
licensee seeking restitution would be required to return what be had
received as part performance by the licensor.' Where the benefits
received by the licensee would be incapable of return in the form ren-
dered, their value might be used to offset the amount awarded in
restitution to the licensee 1 24 Applying this principle to Troxel's case,
the benefits received by Troxel would be apportioned equivalently to
the royalties paid. The agreement was of considerable benefit to Troxel,
allowing it to avoid a costly infringement suit and deterring others
from competing with it 1 26 Even if the licensing agreement were based
on an invalid patent, it must be presumed that until there was an ad-
judication of invalidity, the statutory protectionl" flowing from the
presumedly valid patent' deterred those potential competitors who
were not willing to defend a costly infringement suit from using the
120 For a general discussion of the remedy of rescission, see 12 S. Williston, A Treatise
on the Law of Contracts §§ 1455, 1460 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1970). In seeking rescission and
restitution in the Trinel situation, the plaintiff's action would be grounded on the
theories of breach of implied warranty and misrepresentation. See text at notes 129-32
infra,
121 5 A. Corbin, Contracts 1102, at 548 (1932). Restitution is appropriate where
there has been a failure of consideration, that is, a breach which goes to the essence of
the contract. Id., § 1104, at 558. The breath must be total, discharging the injured party
from any contractual duty. Id. at 562. In the case of a severable contract, where a distinct
part of the licensee's performance would be exchanged for some apportioned part of
the licensor's performance, restitution would be available for the part totally breached.









125 Moreover, a licensing agreement is normally negotiated according to an evalua-
tion of the patent's validity, strength, and value. Thus, payments under a license repre-
sent no more than the estimated worth of the patent. In addition, the licensee will pass
on to the public the royalty expense in the form of higher prices. To permit restitution
of the royalty payments would thus result in double collection of royalties by the
licensee. Brief for the New York Patent Law Association as Amicus Curiae at 12, Troxel
Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 175 U.S.P.Q. 65, Nos. 72-1106-07 (6th Cir., Aug. 11,
1972).
120 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1970) provides: "A patentee shall have remedy by civil action
for infringement of his patent." In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1970) provides: "LC]ourts
having jurisdiction .. . may grant injunctions . . to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent. . . ."
127
 A presumption of validity arises from the issuance of a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1970). See, e.g., Graham v. Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc., 206 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1953).
However, this presumption may be more conjectural than real. See Lemelson v. Topper
Corp., 450 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1971). This presumption, an already fragile element of
the bargain, may be rendered entirely immaterial by permitting recoupment of royalty




patented idea. In addition, the licensee under a pre-patent licensing
agreement may acquire the further benefit of a "head-start" before
the patent issues.128
Accordingly, under the principles of restitution, Troxel could not
be awarded any restoration of royalties since it would be found that
the reasonable value of the counter-performance Troxel had received
—i.e., forbearance from suit for infringement and protection against
other infringers—offset any royalties it had paid. Hence it would ap-
pear that the Troxel district court, in awarding recoupment of royalties,
did so in contravention of basic principles of contract law.
In addition to the unavailability to the licensee of the desired
remedy of restitution, it is submitted that the underlying claim of breach
of contract is arguably invalid. As has previously been demonstrated,
Troxel's action against Schwinn for breach of contract arising from in-
validity of the patent would not give rise to total restitution of all
prior royalty payments to Troxel. It would appear that a licensee in
Troxel's position could not have obtained the recovery sought under
a breach of contract action based on either a breach of warranty theory
or a misrepresentation theory. An allegation based on breach of an im-
plied warranty of a patent's validity or utility would have been hard
to sustain,'" as would one involving an implied warranty of mer-
chantability or fitness for a particular purpose.' 0 Success would not
128 See note 103 supra.
129 Comment, Implied Warranties in Patent, Know-How and Technical Assistance
Licensing Agreements, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 168 (1968). Thus, the licensor, in entering into a
licensing agreement with the licensee, may be presumed to warrant the validity and
utility of the patent. Arguably, an adjudication of invalidity could place the licensor
in breach, thereby entitling the licensee to rescind the licensing agreement and recover
past royalty payments.
However, as a rule, a patent license does not import a warranty of the patent's
validity. R. Ellis, Patent Licenses § 216 (3d ed. A. Deller 1958) [hereinafter cited as
Ellis]. See, e.g., Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 22 Del.
Ch. 333, 338, 2 A.2d 138, 140 (1938) (representation by patentee that patent is valid is
expression of opinion and licensee is not entitled to rely on it); Leese v. Bernard Gladder
Co., 287 Pa. 295, 298, 135 A. 206, 207 (1926) (assignment of patent creates implied
warranty of title in assignor but not warranty of validity). Nor is there a warranty of
the patent's commercial utility. Ellis § 215. See, e.g., Fair v. Shelton, 128 N.C. 105,
107, 38 S.E. 290, 291 (1901); Van Norman v. Barbeau, 54 Minn. 388, 393, 55 N.W. 1112,
1113 (1893). Since the commercial utility of the patent is a secondary indicator of
the patentability of the idea under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970), 383 U.S. at 17-18, a war-
ranty of commercial utility would amount to a partial warranty of validity—a warranty
which will not be implied. A licensee does not receive an implied promise that the
patent, although granted by the Patent Office, has actually met all of the requirements
of the patent laws. Even though the determinations of the Patent Office are the result
of a lengthy period of search and deliberation, the extreme technological difficulty in-
volved in such a procedure, the ex parte nature of the determination, and the Office's
reliance upon the representations of the applicant, leave such determinations of patent-
ability open to judicial review subject to the presumption of validity. Absent congressional
action to the contrary, the court of appeals in Troxel refused to imply a warranty of
validity on similar grounds. Cf. 175 U.S.P.Q. at 70.
130 Uniform Commercial Code H 2-314, 2-315 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.], defines
these implied warranties. These warranties generally apply only to transactions in goods,
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appear more likely in a contract action for rescission of the licensing
agreement alleging fraud as a material breach of the contract,' or in
a tort action for the licensor's deceit in inducing the licensee to enter
into the licensing agreement.182 As in an action for breach of contract,
the licensee would have grave difficulties in utilizing any of these ac-
tions to prove himself entitled to relief consisting—as recoupment
does—of full restitution. In sum, even if the remedy of. recoupment
were impossible to grant on grounds of preemption—specifically, on
account of its inconsistency with federal patent law—it is inappropriate
in an action under state law for restitution.
Finally, although the court of appeals did not analyze the anti-
trust aspects of the case, it is submitted that the recoupment issue
could have been decided under such a theory. The patent plays a
prominent role in a competitive economy. It is a privilege of exclu-
covering the use of an item of sale. U.C.C. § 2-102. Furthermore, U.C.C. § 2-105 defines
"goods" as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale." This definition clearly excludes the
licensing of patent rights. Even though, as in a sale, the licensor acquires substantial rights
in the use of the patent and the licensor receives valuable consideration from this trans-
action (Comment, supra note 129, at 174, 178), a non-exclusive license, like the one
held by Troxel, is unlike a sale, since the licensor retains property rights in the patent.
N.V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken v. AEC, 316 F.2d 401, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1963). A further
obstacle arises in attempting to cast the licensor in the role of a merchant and in estab-
lishing a trade or use by which the merchantability of a novel patent may be judged.
Comment, supra note 129, at 183-85. Moreover, in applying the implied warranty of
fitness, a licensee, whose skill and knowledge are equal to that of the licensor and who
has inspected the materials to be licensed, has probably not justifiably relied on the
licensor. E.g., Gillette v. Kelling Nut Co., 185 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1950); American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Titan Valve & Mfg. Co., 144 F. Supp. 841, 845
(N.D. Ohio 1956).
131
 Restatement of Contracts § 476, at 904 (1932) asserts that a fraudulent trans-
action is voidable as against the defrauded party. When a contract is voidable due to a
fraud, the injured party may escape liability. Id., § 475, comment b at 906. Even if
Sehwinn had made misrepresentations amounting to a material breach of the licensing
agreement, id., § 489, at 932, to the extent that Troxel would be unable to restore what
it had received from Sehwinn, restitution would be denied. Id., § 480, at 916.
182 The courts have held that a licensee may be entitled to recover royalty payments
if he can show deliberate misrepresentation by the licensor before the Patent Office.
Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970); cf. Nashua Corp.
v. RCA Corp., 307 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.N.H. 1969). See Carney, Misrepresentations
Before the Patent Office: Antitrust and Other Legal Effects, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 1005 (1971), for discussion of the elements of proof in an action to recover damages
from the licensor for fraud on the Patent Office. However, where a licensee seeks relief
for injuries caused by misrepresentations made to him by a fraudulent licensor, he must
prove damages under the "out of pocket" measure as the difference between that which
he has parted with and that which he has received. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 110, at
734 (4th ed. 1971). This "out of pocket" rule is akin to restitution in that it looks to the
inequity of permitting the licensor to retain royalty payments procured by fraud rather
than to the damage which the licensee has sustained. Id., at 732. Accordingly, to the
extent that a fraudulent licensor has derived benefit from the royalty payments in excess
of the benefits derived by the licensee from use of the patent, the licensee is entitled to
some recovery. However, Troxel drew valuable benefits from the licensing agreement in
return for royalties paid and recoupment would again be improper.
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sive use and is intended to benefit the public as well as the inventor!"
However, the public is not entitled to disclosure of the inventor's idea
unless he chooses to exploit his invention according to the patent
statute.'" The grant is therefore not a "monopoly" as the term is em-
ployed in the antitrust laws!"
A patentee does not violate either patent or antitrust laws by
using his invention within the limited terms of the patent grant. How-
ever, an aggressive patentee may "misuse" the patent. For example, a
license which extends beyond the scope of the subject matter of the
patent or the term of its effectiveness constitutes "misuse" of the
patent.13° Consequently, the licensor will be denied relief for infringe-
ment which transpires during the period of misuse!'" Application of
the misuse doctrine, however, does not result in forfeiture of the
patent grant!" The concept originated as nothing more than a species
of the equitable "clean hands" doctrine, withholding from the licensor
his remedy for infringement as long as he abused the patent privilege.
Hence the doctrine first served only as an equitable defense against a
licensor's infringement suit, but courts came to incorporate within the
doctrine antitrust as well as patent violations, and accordingly the
defense of patent misuse may now serve as a complete defense in a
patent infringement suit!"
In opposition to this trend, however, it has been argued that, as a
matter of patent policy, the misuse doctrine should be used solely to
prevent the licensor from extending the scope of the patent beyond the
express terms of the grant!" Otherwise, by permitting a patent in-
fringer to choose between a patent or an antitrust defense, depending
upon which would be more advantageous to him, the courts will in-
crease the profitability of patent piracy.141 This school of thought,
then, proposes a return to the limited application of patent misuse as
an equitable bar to the licensor. In contrast, there are those who pro-
188
 E.g., Kendall v. Win.sor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858).
184
 In United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933), the
Court explained:
The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying,
selling, working or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the
grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives
the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something
of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.
In other words, although all ideas in general circulation must be dedicated to the
public good unless protected by a valid federal law does not require that all ideas be put
in general circulation. 442 F.2d at 225.
186 See note 133 supra.
180 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136-37 (1969).
181 Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) ; Nicoson, Misuse of
the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev, 76, 82-83 (1962).
188 Nicoson, supra note 137, at 78.
188 Id. at 88-91.
14° Id. at 110.
141 Id. at 92.
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pose that the concept of patent misuse be wholly abandoned and that a
test looking only for antitrust violations be adopted. 142 Proper use of
a patent would then be assured by a uniform application of the anti-
trust laws. 48
 Under this approach, the court would measure anti-
competitive activity only in terms of antitrust standards, whether or
not the alleged antitrust activity occurred through misuse of a patent.
Following the latter approach, the decision in Lear, lnc. v. Adkins
has been postulated in terms of antitrust law. 44 Assuming arguencla
that this approach is appropriate, a court would apply it to a patent
case in the following manner. The premise of the court's analysis of
the facts before it would be that agreements or state legal doctrines
which insulate a patent from legal challenge, such as licensee estoppel,
may unreasonably restrain trade or tend to create or perpetuate
monopoly."' The court would then apply a two-step test to the re-
straint in question, a test that reveals the interplay between patent and
antitrust laws.14° First, it would decide whether an exemption from the
antitrust laws must necessarily be judicially implied" 7 to ensure the
effectiveness of the fundamental incentive sought to be encouraged
by the federal patent system—specifically, the incentive to invent. 148
Conduct necessary to preserve this incentive includes the right to en-
force the patent, and the right to enter into royalty-bearing licenses"°
prior to an adjudication of invalidity, should one materialize."° If
the implied exemption is unnecessary to the effective working of the
142
 Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: the Search for a Unitary Theory, 35
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 512, 559 (1967).
143 See Austern, Umbras and Penumbras: the Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy,
33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1015 (1965); Briskin, An Area of Confusion: Patents, Monopolies
and the Antitrust Laws, 45 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 741 (1963); McCarthy, A Patent Li-
censing Policy for Minimizing Antitrust and Misuse Risks, 46 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 547
(1964).
144 Stern, Antitrust Implications in Lear v. Adkins, 15 Antitrust Bull. 663, 667
(1970).
143 The question arises as to whether this is a violation of the antitrust laws per se,
or whether evidence is admissible to rebut this claim. The Supreme Court, in Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965), holding
that fraudulent procurement of a patent may constitute a violation of the antitrust laws,
noted that the area of per se Illegality is carefully limited. As a result, evidence must be
presented in each case of actual anticompetitive effects, the exclusionary value of the
fraudulent patent claim being measured in terms of the relevant market for products
covered by the patent claims. A claim to recover past royalty payments might be subject
to a similar standard of proof.
140 Adelman, An Antitrust Decision: Lear v. Adkins, 46 A.B.A.j. 45 (1972).
147 Adelman & Jars, Patent-Antitrust Law: A New Theory, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 1,
6 (1971). The antitrust laws do not provide for an express exemption. However, the
patent laws would be hollow indeed without such immunity. Id..
148 Id. Other incentives often attributed to the patent system are the incentives to
innovate and to invest. By a careful scheme of definitions these incentives may be
distinguished from the incentive to invent, the only activity which always precedes a
grant of letters patent. Id. at 6 & note 19.
142 Id. at 15.
150 Id. at 9-10.
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patent incentive scheme, then the restraint will be measured by gen-
eral antitrust principles 1 51 Presumably some of the traditionally-used
restraints would be found violations of antitrust law, 152
In Troxel, the Sixth Circuit did not employ the two-step method
described above in determining whether recoupment was a suitable
remedy. Initially, the court decided that recoupment was repugnant
to the structure of the patent system. In light of its attendant adverse
effects upon the patent system the court declined to grant such re-
covery.les Thus, in effect, Troxel concluded that the federal patent laws
preempted the state remedy of recoupment where patent licensing
agreements were concerned."' In this respect Troxel followed the
judicial pronouncements in Sears, Cornpco, Lear and Painton. How-
ever, the court might instead have focused on the issue of preemption
of the remedy of recoupment by the federal antitrust laws once it
concluded, without more, that the remedy did not preserve patent in-
centives. Although the remedy of recoupment is judically bestowed,
it may be regarded as a contractual provision of the licensing agree-
ment.' Consequently, the license, if augmented by an implied pro-
vision for recoupment, could be found to fall within the ambit of
section 1 of the Sherman Act' as a "contract, combination or con-
spiracy" in unreasonable restraint of trade.'"
In conclusion, the court of appeals in Troxel refused to permit
the licensee the additional remedy of recoupment primarily because it
would have conflicted with the federal patent laws and hence could
not be allowed to stand under preemption principles. A secondary rea-
son was that existing means of encouraging challenges to improvi-
dently granted patents were adequate without the addition of the pro-
posed remedy. The court correctly ruled that the district court, in
failing to distinguish the facts in Lear from those in Troxel, had ex-
tended Lear beyond the bounds required, and indeed permitted, by
federal patent policy.
It is arguable, however, that the Sixth Circuit was mistaken
in reasoning that recoupment would necessarily deter licensees from
131 Id. at 8. Adelman's two-step method is slightly different from a procedure out-
lined by then Assistant Attorney General Richard McLaren in Patent Licenses and Anti-
trust Consideration, BNA Antitrust and Trade Rag. Rep. No. 413 at X-12 (June 12,
1969):
In considering whether to attack a particular licensing provision or practice, we
ask ourselves fundamental questions, First, is the particular provision justifi-
able as necessary to the patentee's exploitation of his lawful monopoly? Second,
are less restrictive alternatives available to the patentee? Where the answer to the
first question is no and to the second, yes, we will consider bringing a case
challenging the restriction involved.
152 Adelman & Jaress, supra note 147, at 10-23.
153 175 U.S.P.Q. at 68.
154 Sec note 118 supra.
336 Adelman, supra note 146, at 46.
15 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
157 Cf. 175 U.S.P.Q. at 68.
525
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
bringing early challenges to specious patents: Blonder, in permitting
summary judgment of an infringement suit instituted subsequent to
a third party adjudication of invalidity, would permit competitors of
the licensee to engage in open violation of a weak patent with little
economic risk, thereby compelling the licensee to challenge the patent
as early as possible, regardless of whether or not recoupment would ac-
company a successful challenge. It is submitted that further develop-
ment of a point made in the opinion would add support to the court's
conclusion: that recoupment might erode the very foundations of the
federal patent system by compelling inventors to forego patents and
seek instead the protection of the trade secret agreement, thereby
upsetting the present delicate balance between patent and trade secret
law. Finally, principles of state contract law and antitrust law provide
additional grounds, though not utilized by the Sixth Circuit, for re-
fusing recoupment. Specifically, Troxel should be barred from seeking
restitution of royalty payments under state contract law because he
had received considerable benefit from use of the patent; and if re-
coupment were made available as the district court proposed, licensing
agreements could be deemed to incorporate the remedy by implication
and accordingly would be characterized as unreasonable restraints of
trade.
HOWARD B. BARNARY, JR.
Securities Regulation—Investment Company Act of 1940—Control
Transfer Profits—Fiduciary Duty of Mutual Fund Advisers—Kuk-
man v. Baumi—Securities Supervisors, Inc. (Supervisors) served as
the investment adviser and principal underwriter 2 for three open-end
investment companies 2—Selected American Shares, Inc. (Selected
American), Selected Special Shares, Inc. (Selected Special), and
Selected Opportunity Fund, Inc. (Selected Opportunity)—pursuant to
management agreements between each of the funds and Supervisors. 4
1 346 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
2 As investment adviser, Supervisors provided, in addition to other incidental services,
supervision of investment and analysis of companies, securities, and economic conditions,
and also furnished statistical, administrative and bookkeeping services, as well as office
space and personneL Id. at 56 n.1.
"As principal underwriter, Supervisors acts as agent of the funds in selling their
shares, at a discount from the public offering price, to dealers who in turn sell the shares
to the public at the applicable public offering price.". Id. at 56.
a The funds are investment companies registered pursuant to the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. IR 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the
Act]. Section 80a-5(a)(1) defines an open-end company as "a management company
which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the
issuer." For a collection of authorities discussing the history of the Act see Comment,
Protecting the Interests of Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-Corporation
Control (or, Policing the Traffic in Other People's Money), 68 Yale L.J. 113 n.4 (1958).
4 Section 15(a) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to serve or act as
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